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CONCLUSION

These recent decisions contrast two schools of interpretation of the
International Shoe doctrine: On the one hand are the state legislatures,
seeking maximum jurisdiction in the interests of local residents by defining "minimum contacts" in such terms as "any contract made in this
State,"8' 0 or the repeated solicitation of business in this State by mail or
otherwise, 8 or the distribution of goods with the "reasonable expectation" that they will be used in this state and are so used,8 2 or "tortious
conduct" in this state, 83 provided the suit against the foreign corporation
arises out of such "contacts. '8 4 On the other hand are the courts, refusing to accept these definitions when it is thought they will "offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"8 5 yet accepting
them when they are thought not to so offend.
It has been observed that by granting to the judiciary the power to
determine what is "fair play" or "substantial justice" sets up the courts
as policy-making bodies.8 6 There is no argument here. The question
is, what is the policy? And what is it to be tomorrow? From what has
gone before, these observations seem justified: (1) Since International
Shoe, the trend is clearly toward broader state jurisdiction; (2) however, there is a marked tendency to require physical presence of the
'agents of the corporation in the state before subjecting it to suit therein;
and (3) the forum's inconvenience to the parties is sometimes deemed
a factor but is of dubious pertinence; (4) although in the desire to secure
a fair trial the doctrine of forum non conveniens may be seemingly incorrectly applied. It may be expected that, in the future, the "presence"
and "convenience" factors will decline in importance, resulting in even
broader state jurisdiction, with the forum non conveniens doctrine available as a safeguard against injustice to the foreign corporation.
FREDERICK A. BABSON, JR.
Taxation-Marital Deduction-Life Insurance Proceeds and the
Terminable Interest Rule
In the Internal Revenue Act of 19481 Congress repealed the 1942
community property amendments, 2 and added the now familiar marital
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38.1 (a) (1) (Sup p. 1955).

1Id., subdivision (2).
"Id., subdivsion (3).
":Id., subdivision (4).
"Id., subsection (a).
"International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. at 316.
"Note, 20 TUL. L. REv. 437, 439 (1946). Justice Black, dissenting in the
International Shoe case, 326 U. S. at 323, stated: "I think it a judicial deprivation to condition its exercise [state jurisdiction] upon this Court's notion of 'fair
play,' however appealing that term may be."
'INT. REV. AcT OF 1948, 62 STAT. 110 (1948).
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, Sec. 811, as amended 62 STAT. 116 (1948).
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deduction provision3 to the Federal Estate Tax.
After setting out the marital deduction, the provision states that
under certain circumstances, where the interest in property passing from
the decedent to the surviving spouse might terminate or fail, the interest
will not qualify for the deduction.4 This portion of the section has come
to be known as the "Terminable Interest Rule."
Broadly, the terminable interest rule excepts from marital deduction
any asset included in decedent's gross estate which may, by any event,
ultimately pass from the decedent to any person other than the surviving
spouse for less than a full consideration in money or monies worth, and
be possessed and enjoyed by such person after the surviving spouse.5
For example, a terminable interest involving life insurance: decedent's
life insurance proceeds are to be held by the insurer and are to be paid
to the surviving spouse over a ten year period, with the added provision
that if the surviving spouse should die within ten years, all remaining
installments should be paid to decedent's children. In this case if the
surviving spouse were to die within ten years, the interest in the property,
which originally passed to decedent's surviving spouse, would terminate
and pass to, and be enjoyed by, decedent's children for less than a full
consideration. The fact that the surviving spouse may have a life expectancy of more than ten years will not prevent the interest from being
terminable. It is enough that the interest may terminate and pass to
someone else.
It is also important to note that to come within the rule, the interest
must pass from the decedent to someone other than the surviving spouse.
If the insurance proceeds were given to the surviving spouse as a lump
sum settlement, and the surviving spouse later made a gift of the proceeds to other persons, the terminable interest rule would not apply since
the proceeds would pass, not from the decedent to such other person, but
from the surviving spouse.
The recently published proposed estate tax regulations for the Internal Revenue Code of 19546 have clarified a recent change in the
application of the terminable interest rule to life insurance payments
I INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, Sec. 812 (e)added by 62 STAT. 117 (1948), amended
62 STAT. 1214 (1948).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 812 (e) (1), 62 STAT. 117 (1948), amended 62
STAT. 1214 (1948),
'Id. See also Estate of Reilly v. Comm., 239 F. 2d 707 (3rd Cir. 1957). To
qualify for marital deduction the asset must pass to the surviving spouse. The
terminable rule concerns cases where an interest in property passing to the surviving
spouse may terminate and pass to someone other than the surviving spouse. The
purpose of the rule is to prevent property, which is not taxed in decedent's estate,
from passing to someone other than the surviving spouse. Under the terminable
interest rule an asset is taxed in either decedent's estate, or in estate of surviving
spouse provided it is not dissipated or given away by surviving spouse prior to her
death.
'21 Fed. Reg. 7850 (1956).
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made to the surviving spouse. The following discussion will be limited
7
to the application of the rule to such proceeds.
Terminable Interest Rule Prior to 1954 Code
Section 812 (e) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19398 sets out
the "power of appointment" exception to the terminable interest -rule.
Subparagraph G is made applicable to only life insurance and annuity
payments. 9 Although stated in the code section, the requirements that
must be followed to bring payments within this exception are more
clearly stated in the regulations,' ° as follows:
"1) The proceeds must be held by the insurer subject to an agreement either to pay the proceeds in installments, or to pay interest thereon,
with all such amounts payable during the life of the surviving spouse
payable only to her.
"2) Such installments or interest must be payable annually or more
frequently, commencing not later than 13 months after the decedent's
death.
"3) The surviving spouse must have the power, exercisable in favor
or her estate, to appoint all amounts so held by the insurer.
herself
of
"4) Such power in the surviving spouse must be exercisable by such
surviving spouse alone and (whether exercisable by will or during life)
must be exercisable in all events.
"5) The amounts payable under such a contract must not be subject
For a full discussion of the Terminable Interest Rule as applied to other
interests passing from decedent to the surviving spouse, see Lowndes & Kramer,
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 386 (1956).
s Sec. 812 (e) (1) (G)-Life Insurance or Annuity Payments with Power of
Appointment in the Surviving Spouse-In the case of an interest in property passing from the decedent consisting of proceeds under a life insurance, endowment,
or annuity contract, if under the terms of the contract such proceeds are payable
in installments, or are held by the insurer subject to an agreement to pay interest
thereon (whether the proceeds upon termination of any interest payments are payable in a lump sum or in annual or more frequent installments), and such installments or interest payments are payable annually or at more frequent intervals
commencing not later than thirteen months after decedent's death, and all amounts
payable during the life of the surviving spouse are payable only to such spouse,
and such spouse has the power to appoint all amounts payable under such contract
(exercisable in favor of such surviving spouse, or of the estate of such surviving
spouse, whether or not in each case the power is exercisable in favor of the others)
with no power in any other person to appoint to any person other than the surviving spouse any part of the amounts payable under such contract.
(i) such proceeds shall, for purposes of subparagraph (A) be considered
as passing to the surviving spouse, and
(ii) No part of such proceeds shall, for purposes of subparagraph (B) (i), be
considered as passing to any person other than the surviving spouse.
This subparagraph shall be applicable only if, under the terms of the contract,
such power in the surviving spouse to appoint, whether exercisable by will or during
life. is exercisable by such spouse alone, and in all events."
o Other portions of § 812 (e) (1) apply the power of appointment exception
than life insurance.
surviving spouse other1956).
to interest passing to the(a)
(d) (1) (Supp.
"026 C. F. R. 81.47
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to a power of appointment in any person, to appoint any part thereof, to
any person other than the surviving spouse." (Emphasis added.)
In applying these regulations to an insurance plan the particular requirement that would cause special difficulty is that which states that
the power of appointment in the surviving spouse must extend to "all the
amounts so held by the insurer." It would follow from this requirement
that if the power of appointment in the surviving spouse extended to only.
a portion of the proceeds held by the insurer, and the remainder were
to be paid out as a terminable interest, then none of the proceeds would
qualify for marital deduction.
The question thus facing the estate planner was, how could the
settlement of life insurance proceeds be arranged so that although all of
the proceeds would not qualify for marital deduction, at least that
portion which satisfied the five requirements would qualify.
The regulations gave a solution to this question by a provision which
stated in effect that if the insured, by the contract, directed that the proceeds be paid into separate funds to be held by the insurer and if the
above requirements were satisfied as to all amounts held in any one of
these separate funds, then the portion of the proceeds in that fund would
qualify for marital deduction." This separation of the insurance proceeds by direction in the contract appeared to be the only way the proceeds would be divided into separate interests, for marital deduction
purposes.
2
The case of Estate of Reilly v. Commissioner of InternalRevenue,'
though not involving the power of appointment provision, presented an
interesting aspect of this problem. There the decedent's life insurance
was planned so that the surviving spouse would receive a life annuity,
with payments guaranteed for ten years. The policy further provided
that if the surviving spouse died within ten years, all remaining payments would be made to decedent's children. The beneficiaries were
denied the right to alienate, commute, assign, or anticipate payments.' 3
The insurer, by actuarial computation had determined that of the
$58,000 insurance proceeds, $28,000 would be necessary to pay the
annuity for the ten year period, and $30,000 to pay the life annuity to
the wife after the ten years. The tax payer conceded that the $28,000
necessary to pay the installments over the ten year period was a terminable interest,' 4 but argued that since annuity payments to the surviving
126 C. F. R. 81.47 (a) (d)

(2) (Supp. 1956).
239 F. 2d 797 (3rd Cir. 1957). Tax Court decision appears in 25 T. C. 366
(1955).
" If the surviving spouse were given such powers it might be argued that they
were tantamount to a power of appointment.
" This portion was a terminable interest since the surviving spouse might die
within ten years and then an interest in the property would pass to someone other
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spouse after the ten year period was not a terminable interest,"; the portion of the insurance proceeds necessary for those payments should
qualify for marital deduction. The commissioner argued that "property"
as used in the code referred to the entire property and that none of the
insurance proceeds should qualify for marital deduction. The court, in
adopting the taxpayer's theory that the insurance proceeds could be divided into separate property interests, stated, "The fact that each single
property had its genesis in the same piece of paper is of no consequence
taxwise."'16 As support for its holding the court cites the regulation
providing for the separation of the proceeds into two funds.17 Apparently, the court felt that although the decedent did not specifically direct
payment into separate funds, he inadvertently accomplished the same
result by choosing a settlement option as he did."8
Thus, prior to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, if a division of
insurance proceeds was desired for marital deduction purposes, the decedent could either direct that proceeds be divided into separate funds
or hope that the court would hold that the settlement options selected accomplished the same result.
Terminable Interest Under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
When the power of appointment provision applicable to life insurance proceeds in the Internal Revenue Code of 195410 is compared to its
counterpart under the 1939 Code 20 the change in government policy in
the area becomes quite apparent.
Section 812 (e) (1) (G) of the 1939 Code, in setting out the requirements for marital deduction states, "and such spouse has the power
to appoint all amounts payable under such contract" (Emphasis added).
Section 2056 (b) (6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is almost
than the surviving spouse, here the decedent's children, for less than an adequate
consideration, and be possessed and enjoyed by them.
"As for payments after the ten year period, upon the death of the surviving
spouse all payments ceased and no interest passed to anyone else.
10239 F. 2d 797, 800. (3rd Cir. 1957.)
'726 C. F. R. 81.47 (a) (d) (2) (Supp. 1956).
18 In Shedds Estate v. Commissioner, 237 F. 2d 345 (9th Cir. 1956) involving
property held in trust ior the decedent's surviving spouse, the surviving spouse's
interest in the trust entitled her to two-thirds of the income for life, and gave her
power of appointment over one-half of the corpus. Though the question was not
discussed, the Court refused to allow the corpus to be split into separate property
interests, but gave full effect to subsection F of § 812 (e) (1) of the 1939 Code,
which requires that the surviving spouse must have power of appointment over
the entire corpus before marital deduction will be permitted. The Court said,
"It is well settled that statutory exemption from taxes of this kind should be
strictly construed against the taxpayer, and are held applicable only to subject matter
or beneficiaries clearly within their terms." Ibid. at 357. Apparently this view
was not adopted by the Court in the Reilly case.
19 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056 (b) (6).
-o INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 812 (e) (1)
(G). See footnote 8 for the complete section.
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identical to the comparable section of the 1939 Code except that the 1954
Code section states, "and all amounts, or a specific portion of all such
amounts, payable during the life of the surviving spouse are payable only
to her, and such surviving spouse has power to appoint all amounts,
or such specific portions, payable under such contract" (Emphasis
added) .21
Thus, under the 1954 Code, if the power of appointment requirements are satisfied as to only a portion of the insurance proceeds, that
portion will qualify for marital deduction even though the remainder of
the proceeds may be paid out as a terminable interest. The estate planner can now apply the power of appointment provision without any fear
that if any part of of the insurance proceeds are paid out as a terminable
interest, it will cause the entire proceeds to be disqualified for marital
deduction purposes.
Under the 1954 Code, if interest on the entire proceeds of decedent's
insurance were to be paid to the surviving spouse during his or her
life time and the proceeds were to be paid to decedent's children at the
death of the surviving spouse, if the wife were given a power to appoint
only one-third of the proceeds, then only that one third would qualify
for marital deduction. Conversely, if the wife had power of appointment
over the entire proceeds, but received interest on only one third, still
only one third would qualify.

22

Now that the government has clearly adopted a policy of allowing
proceeds to be divided into separate properties where the power of
appointment provision is used, the question remains, will that policy be
adopted in situations such as the Reilly case presented, where the power
of appointment provision is not applied. It would seem that since the
policy has been adopted, it would be applied in all cases, whether or not
the power of appointment provision is involved.
Summary
In dealing with the particular area of marital deduction, the estate
planner must make certain that, as to the portion of the life insurance
proceeds which he expects to qualify for marital deduction, all of the
requirements are met.
1 In the Proposed Estate Tax Regulations, under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, published in 21 Fed. Reg. 7901 (1956) the clause, "or such specific portions
of such proceeds" is included in all appropriate places. With this clause added, the
five requirements of a valid power of appointment, as set out earlier in the note,
are the same under the 1954 Code proposed regulations as under the regulations
for the 1939 Code. A similar addition was also made in § 2056 (b) (5) of the 1954
Code relating to life estates with power of appointment in the surviving spouse.
".In the second example, as to the two-thirds of the proceeds on which the wife
did not receive interest, the requirement that proceeds must be held subject to an
agreement to pay interest (or installments) thereon to surviving spouse during her
life time, would not have been met.
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Special notice should be taken to the following:
1) Payments of either interest or installments must be made during
the life of the surviving spouse, and only to the surviving spouse. Here
special care should be taken in making certain that interest, or even
dividends, could not be received by anyone other than the surviving
spouse.
2) Payments must be made at least annually, and commence within
thirteen months of decedent's death. An annuity for the surviving
spouse that would commence two years from decedent's death would
fail to qualify if interest were not paid in the interim.
3) The power of appointment in the surviving spouse can be exercisable only in favor of the surviving spouse or her estate.
4) Only the surviving spouse may exercise the power of appointment, and it must be exercisable in all events. If the policy provided
that the surviving spouse would lose the power of appointment, for
23
example, if she remarried, this condition would not be satisfied.
It would pay the estate planner to compare payments made under
each settlement option employed, with the requirements set out in the
regulations, with particular attention toward all contingencies that might
occur under each option. In this way the planner would be assured
that the proceeds which he expects to qualify would, in the final analysis,
be subject to marital deduction.
ROBERT

M.

HUTTAR.

Torts-Distinction Between Intentional and Negligent Conduct Under
Tort Claims Act
Governmental immunity from civil suit is an historical characteristic
of Anglo-American jurisprudence. The principle developed in England
on the premise that "the king can do no wrong." 1 While it may be
said that immunity is still the basic rule and liability the exception, the
modern trend is to allow limited avenues of enforceable liability against
the government.2 In allowing itself to be sued for any wrongful act of
its employees and permitting liability "to the same extent as a private
individual,"3 the Federal Government, with a few exceptions, 4 has

"aThe only exception to this rule is that an interest passing to surviving spouse
will not be considered terminable because of a common disaster clause provided 1)
the clause does not exceed six months, and 2) the termination of wife's interest by
a common disaster does not, in fact, occur. Sec. 21 Fed. Reg. 7894 (1956).
' See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 33 Law. Ed. 842 (1889).
Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N. Y. U. L. REv.
1363 (1954).

828 U. S. C. § 2674 (1952).
4 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (1952).

